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Technocracy as a challenge to political freedom in the digital age
The government of the former Prime-Minister of Ukraine Olexiy Honcharuk named itself “the government of 
technocrats”. This shows that the concept of technocracy becomes attractive in Ukraine. Technocracy is the form of 
government, which attempts to distance itself from political representation or affiliation with a particular ideology. 
Technocrats derive their legitimacy from their skills and expertise, and focus primarily on problem-solving and 
optimizing the society’s useful functions. 
Technocracy has always been a promising political concept. The Republic by Plato can be regarded as the first 
attempt to substantiate a technocratic society, in which power proceeds from the expertise of its dominant elite. 
Technocracy was very appealing in the industrial age, when scientific management of factories inspired the idea 
that society at large could be governed by similar methods. Today, digital technologies and Big Data reinvigorate 
the technocratic project. 
In this article it has been shown that technocracy, if taken too far, can be antithetical to liberal democracy 
and its core value – political freedom. Technocratic society resembles a corporation run by the board of directors 
rather than a republic of citizens. We have pointed out the factors, which make it appealing in the modern world. 
We then have analyzed the ideas of Howard Scott, the founder of the movement Technocracy Inc., who advocated 
this political model in the industrial age, and Parag Khanna, who has made similar claims about the benefits of 
technocracy in the digital age. It has been proven that both these thinkers share the same illiberal mindset including 
the common faith in the applicability of scientific methods of social management without regard for popular votes 
and opinions, admiration of autocratic powers of the day, and disregard for democratic procedures, which they see 
as hurdles on the path toward economic well-being and political domination. Finally, we asked the question: if the 
challenge to political freedom in Ukraine proceeds from technocracy, will it be defended in the same way as during 
the three Ukrainian Maidans (1990, 2004, 2014)? We deliberately leave this question unanswered, hoping that the 
answer will be investigated in future publications. 
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Технократія як виклик політичній свободі у цифрову епоху
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Львівський національний університету імені Івана Франка
Уряд колишнього прем'єр-міністра України Олексія Гончарука назвав себе «урядом технократів». Це 
вказує на те, що концепція технократії стає дедалі привабливішою в Україні. Технократія – це тип правління, 
що намагається дистанціюватися від політичного представництва чи приналежності до певної ідеології. 
Легітимність технократів обумовлена, передусім, їхніми навичками, а свою увагу вони зосереджують, 
передусім, на вирішенні проблем та оптимізації корисних функцій суспільства. 
Технократія була привабливою у різні історичні епохи. «Державу» Платона можна вважати першою 
спробою обґрунтувати технократичне суспільство, в якому влада ґрунтується на навиках та знаннях його 
керівної верстви. Також, технократію вважали напрочуд перспективною у промислову епоху, коли науковий 
менеджмент підприємств надихнув ідею, що суспільством загалом можна керувати схожими методами. 
Сьогодні технократія отримує новий стимул від стрімкого розвитку комп’ютерних технологій і «великих 
даних». 
У статті стверджується, що технократичний проект може суперечити ліберальній демократії та її 
ключовій цінності – політичній свободі. Технократичне суспільство нагадує радше корпорацію, якою керує 
рада директорів, аніж республіку громадян. Було вказано на фактори, які лежать в основі привабливості 
технократії у сучасному світі. Також, було проаналізовано ідеї Говарда Скотта, засновника руху 
Technocracy Inc. у 1930-х рр. у США, який відстоював технократію у промислову епоху, та Параґа Ханни, 
який обґрунтовує її переваги над демократією у цифрову епоху. Обидва автори мають чітко виражену 
антиліберальну позицію, яка включає переконання, що суспільством потрібно керувати на основі «наукових 
методів», а не демократичних голосів; захоплення авторитарними державами відповідних історичних епох, 
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Introduction. 
The government of the former Prime-Minister of Ukraine Olexiy Honcharuk named itself “the 
government of technocrats.” (RPR, 2019) This 
shows that the concept of technocracy becomes 
ever more attractive for Ukraine. Technocrats 
distance themselves from political ideologies, 
representation of particular groups of voters, 
and affiliation with traditions and values of 
society. Instead, they attempt to act as managers 
focusing primarily on problem-solving and 
optimizing the society’s useful output. Their 
techniques are purely instrumental: more GDP, 
less crime and poverty, better infrastructure, 
etc., and their political credo is not liberalism, 
conservatism, socialism or nationalism, but, 
mostly, pragmatism. Technocratic politicians, 
thus, resemble rather corporate managers than 
elected representatives of the people. 
Technocracy becomes especially appealing 
in times of crisis. In an unstable society, plagued 
by conflicts and tug-wars between different sets 
of values (national, ideological or religious), 
there is a temptation to bring to power apolitical 
administrators, who will dissociate themselves 
from thorny political issues and will act 
as neutral managers addressing only those 
problems, which can be objectively measured 
and are usually universally approved (the growth 
of economy, fighting corruption, building a 
better infrastructure, etc.). Therefore, it was 
no coincidence that the government of Olexiy 
Honcharuk presented itself as technocratic 
precisely after the divisive presidential 
elections in Ukraine in 2019. Even the President 
Volodymyr Zelensky himself referred to this 
rhetoric when he said, in his 2020 New Year 
address, that “the name of the street doesn’t 
matter because it is lit and paved.” (UNIAN, 
2020)
Considering the high level of support of this 
speech (Rating, 2020), as well as the fact that 
over 60% of Ukrainians uphold the argument 
that “the country needs a ‘strong hand’ rather 
than the talks about democracy” (Protsenko, 
2019), technocracy might become a viable 
political option in our country.
In this article, we made an attempt to show 
that technocracy, if taken too far, is a dangerous 
position, which can threaten the core political 
value – freedom. The thinking behind this 
model (emphasis on pragmaticism, rationality, 
welfare and useful output) has already inspired 
a series of illiberal political projects, both 
imaginary (e. g., Thomas More’s Utopia) and 
real-life (totalitarian and autocratic regimes of 
the 20th and 21st centuries). 
In the modern world technocracy is again 
very attractive. Several factors have converged 
to make it so. First of all, the rise of Big Data 
and sophisticated computer technologies. The 
digital age fosters the idea that for the first 
time in history, thanks to new technologies, 
it is possible to solve every human problem 
virtually and to create a “better” society. 
Second, democracy nowadays faces hardships. 
Not only has a tide of populism recently swept 
over Europe and North America, but also the 
global pandemic has shown that it could be 
surprisingly easy for people to give up their 
liberties and yield to instrumental regimentation 
of their lives. Third, the rapid economic growth 
in the East (especially, in China and Singapore) 
versus stagnation in the West makes the East 
Asian autocratic political model, based on 
technocratic expertise rather than democratic 
legitimacy, an appealing ideal for the rest of 
the world. In the past, Western countries could 
attribute their successful economies to their 
democratic politics. Today, against the backdrop 
of China, they can no longer make such claims.
The aim of research is to give weight 
to the claim that excessive technocracy can 
be detrimental to political freedom. In this 
article, we made an attempt to show why it 
might be the case and how it can occur in the 
digital age. In today’s rapidly changing world, 
Ukraine should find an optimal model of its 
political development. Since the first persons 
а також трактування демократичних норм і процедур як перепон на шляху до економічного процвітання 
та політичної могутності. Наприкінці було поставлено питання: якщо основний виклик для політичної 
свободи в Україні походитиме від технократії, чи захищатимуть її так само, як це відбувалося під час трьох 
українських Майданів (1990, 2004, 2014 рр.)? Ми залишаємо це запитання без відповіді, сподіваючись, що 
воно буде досліджено у майбутніх публікаціях. 
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of our country have declared their commitment 
to technocracy, we hope that this article can 
contribute to the awareness about the potential 
dangers of this political model.  
Analysis of publications. The perils 
of unrestrained technocratic government 
have already been covered in a number of 
publications, including: (Reiser & Hebenstreit, 
2020), (Esmark, 2020), (Easterly, 2019), 
(Berman, 2018), (Bickerton & Accetti, 2015), 
(Habermas, 2015), (Bucchi, 2009), (Centeno, 
1993). Among older publications, which still 
contain valuable insights into the topic, is: 
(Temple, 1944). An eulogy to technocracy as a 
viable alternative to democracy in the digital age 
can be found in: (Khanna, 2017). Consideration 
of illiberal political practices assisted by digital 
technologies can be found in: (Harari, 2018), 
(Gray, 2019). The discussion about the political 
value of freedom and its connection with liberal 
democracy can be found in: (Bova, 1997), 
(Beetham, 2004), (Laniuk, 2019). 
Discussion. 
The term “technocracy” derives from the 
Greek words “τέχνη” (tekhne meaning skill) 
and “κράτος” (kratos meaning power). Based 
on the ambiguity of the Greek work tekhne, it 
is possible to interpret it in two ways: 1. as the 
power of the scientific and technical elite; 2. as 
the power of technologies, which the British 
economist Arthur W. Brian defines as “a means 
to fulfill a human purpose.” (Brian, 2011, 
p. 28). Miguel Angel Centeno characterizes 
technocracy as “the administrative and 
political domination of a society by a state 
elite and allied institutions that seek to impose 
a single, exclusive policy paradigm based 
on the application of instrumentally rational 
techniques” (Centeno, 1993). This definition 
highlights the unity between technologies and 
power whereby human society is approached as 
a kind of “raw material” for the implementation 
of rationally defined policies of its dominant 
elite. 
In this article, the connection between 
freedom and democracy will not be covered, 
because we have already done it in our previous 
publication (Laniuk, 2019). For this analysis 
it would be enough to say that we regard 
liberal democracy as institutionalized freedom. 
According to Isaiah Berlin, political freedom 
has two dimensions, namely, negative and 
positive one (Berlin, 1969, p. 121). Liberal 
democracy enables both these dimensions. 
It is the guardian of negative freedom (via its 
courts and law-enforcement agencies) and 
the embodiment of positive freedom (through 
elections and referendums representing the 
will of the people). This allows interpreting 
freedom as an “Alpha and Omega” of liberal 
democracy. This does not deny, of course, 
that liberal democracies should not strive for 
effective governance, capable leadership or 
powerful military, however, these goals should 
be regarded not as independent ends, but only 
as a means of protecting and increasing their 
citizens’ freedom. 
On the other hand, the “Alpha and Omega” 
of technocracy is not freedom, but the pragmatic 
optimization of society’s measurable functions 
(more GDP, less crime, etc.). If democratic 
procedures and human rights stay in the way 
of these functions, a consistent technocrat will 
brush them aside, as it happens, for example, in 
China or Singapore, where the society’s useful 
output and smooth workings of its institutions 
are more praised than the rights and freedoms of 
its citizens. According to Centeno, technocracy 
has several characteristics, which constitute 
it as a specific political form. The technocrats 
are usually appointed rather than elected. They 
focus primarily on problem-solving than on 
representation. Usually, they have received 
a technical education and, because of this 
fact, have a “shared faith in the applicability 
and superiority of technical methodologies 
and paradigms,” which is accompanied by 
the “assumption that rationality is beyond 
dogmatism, and that scientific analysis 
knows no ideology.” (Centeno, 1993) Their 
commitment to scientific rationality determines 
their implicit and often explicit, rejection of 
politics as “inefficient and possibly corruptive.” 
(Centeno, 1993)
Technocracy can be seen as an antagonistic 
pole of democracy. Democracy emphasizes the 
sovereignty of people; technocracy believes in 
the sovereignty of expertise. Democracy first 
represents and then rules, technocracy favors 
ruling without representation. Democracy is 
based on the premise that society consists of 
different groups and interests; technocracy treats 
it as an indiscriminate whole. Technocracy is not 
only opposed to democracy, but, according to 
Centeno, is also similar to theocratic regimes of 
the ancient world: “In imposing the domination 
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by an instrumental rationale and scientific 
method, technocracies are similar to theocratic 
regimes or states that have explicit, dominant 
political ideologies. In all these cases, legitimacy 
comes not from the barrel of a gun or from the 
ballot box, but from adherence to the dictates 
of a ‘book.’ Whether that document contains 
the word of God, a theory of history, or the 
econometric functions that describe equilibria, 
those best able to interpret its message and 
implement its laws cannot take opposition or 
popular participation into account.” (Centeno, 
1993)
Technocracy is opposed not only to 
democracy, but also to freedom, insofar 
as freedom is its supreme value. The most 
straightforward way to view it in this light is to 
point out the common features of technocracy 
and totalitarianism. The application of 
“instrumentally rational techniques,” which 
must produce “measurable results,” according to 
Centeno, is a distinctive feature of technocracy, 
but historically it has been a hallmark of 
totalitarianism. Aldous Huxley wrote his 
famous dystopia Brave New World (1932) 
under the impression from the rule of scientists 
and engineers who were summoned by Franklin 
D. Roosevelt into his administration after the 
start of the Great Depression. Though Huxley’s 
novel is a fiction, he nevertheless captured the 
technocratic dream: a society, which is ruled 
“scientifically” and whose every aspect is 
carefully analyzed, planned and controlled by 
the experts.
The old adage says: “The road to hell is paved 
with good intentions.” The technocratic pursuit 
of efficiency, convenience and measurable 
outputs, if left unchecked, can lead to a tyrannical 
prison-world. The Utopian socialists (Henri de 
Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Étienne Cabet 
and Robert Owen) described rationally planned 
and scientifically governed societies. These 
early speculations inspired Karl Marx and 
Vladimir Lenin to conceive not a fictional, but a 
real totalitarian world, whose distinctive feature 
was a large-scale technocratic experimentation 
with nature and society. 
At one point, technocracy also had 
totalitarian overtones in the United States. 
Scathing criticism of the views of Howard Scott, 
the founder of the movement Technocracy 
Inc., uncovers the totalitarian features of 
technocracy. In the 1930s, Scott proposed to 
replace American politicians with scientists 
and engineers and founded a social movement 
to assist this goal. We would like to cite some 
of Scott’s arguments along with the responses 
of his critic Paul Temple, because they bear a 
striking resemblance to the rhetoric of today’s 
champions of technocracy, which we will 
analyze later in this article (unfortunately, no 
works of Howard Scott are directly available in 
Ukraine, therefore, we quote his arguments as 
cited by his critique Paul Temple).
Scott believed that it was “a grandiose 
nonsense” that “the collective multiplication 
of human opinion was the nearest possible 
approach to divine omniscience in the solution 
of all political problems” (as cited in Temple, 
1944). “Political liberty,” he believed, “is a 
dead issue today” (as cited in Temple 1944). 
Paul Temple commented in 1944 that these 
passages sounded as “translations from 
contemporary German:” “The Nazis,” he wrote, 
“based their anti-democratic propaganda on a 
mystic ‘Führer-prinzip,’ while Scott bases his 
on ‘science.’ No one ever took a vote on the law 
of gravitation, reasons Scott like a precocious 
schoolboy. Why should we rely on votes to tell 
us how to engineer society?” (Temple, 1944)
The sole rationale of technocracy, according 
to Scott, is that it was efficient. “Technocrats,” 
he explained, “are not filled with any love for 
humanity or influenced by any ethical idea but 
are primarily concerned with function” (as cited 
in Temple, 1944). This serves as a “sufficient 
reason” to adopt technocracy even despite the 
wishes of the people who would have to live 
under it. 
In 1939, Scott’s movement adopted 
the attributes, which were very similar to 
the “black shirts” of Mussolini or Hitler’s 
“Sturmabteilung.” Its members wore uniforms 
and called Scott “the Chief” (English translation 
of Der Führer). In his pamphlet Pax Americana 
(1939), Scott curtsied to Adolf Hitler writing 
that “Technocracy would like to point out 
that regardless of how we regard Herr Hitler 
and the Nazi regime of Germany, they are the 
embodiment of the expression of the will of 
the German people” (as cited in Temple, 1944). 
According to Paul Temple, he said the same 
for Stalin (then Hitler’s partner), praising the 
“increased efficiency brought about by their 
regimes” (as cited in Temple, 1944).
This brief analysis shows that technocracy 
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can be antithetical to freedom. When the 
society’s productive output and frictionless 
workings of its institutions displace freedom 
as the main rationale of its existence, such a 
society downgrades to a sort of “animal farm,” 
which is run “scientifically”. People will be 
unable to control the policies affecting them and 
the society will resemble rather a corporation 
run by the board of directors than a republic of 
citizens.
Despite its illiberal overtones and past 
failures, technocracy is a recurrent lure. It was 
attractive in different historical epochs (ancient, 
as well as modern), but mostly in transitional 
historical periods, when new political, economic 
and social practices challenged the established 
values. One example was the Renaissance. 
When the medieval society was collapsing 
under the joint force of capitalist economy 
and scientific rationality, many thinkers (e.g., 
Thomas More, Tommaso Campanella, Francis 
Bacon, etc.) devised ideal communities ruled 
by dispassionate administrators for the benefit 
of all their members. Another episode was the 
industrial age when the efficient and highly 
rational management of labor at factories 
inspired the idea that society at large could be 
governed by the same methods. 
Today, new technologies also create 
similar temptations and feats. Big Data and 
cutting-edge computers have accelerated the 
economy and awakened the old dream about 
infinite progress. Therefore, there are again 
voices asking whether it would not be better 
to entrust the society to “experts” rather than 
voters. At the same time, the competition 
with such countries, as China, that introduce 
technocratic methods of ruling without much 
regard for privacy and human rights, prompts 
their western counterparts to follow the 
same road. Unsurprisingly, there are already 
champions of this political ideal. Let us quote 
one of them.
Like Howard Scott in the 1930s, the 
American author Parag Khanna in his book 
Technocracy in America: Rise of the Info-
State (2017) repeatedly argues that democracy 
is passing out and does nothing good except 
breeding populism and bringing to power 
mostly incompetent politicians. According to 
him, “everyday people don’t measure their 
lives by how democratic their state is, but 
whether they feel safe in their cities, can afford 
their homes, have stability in their work, have a 
plan for growing old and can remain connected 
to friends and family” (Khanna, 2017, p. 14). 
A good political system is the one which 
“delivers:” “The input of democracy,” he 
argues, “can never compensate for the output 
legitimacy of delivering the basics” (Khanna, 
2017, p. 20).
In his book he makes a forthright claim 
that human rights, the rule of law, the people’s 
sovereignty and other pillars of democracy 
can be sacrificed for the sake of economic 
output and material well-being. “We are 
coming to appreciate,” writes Khanna, “that 
the difference between successful and failing 
countries is not rich vs. poor, left vs. right or 
democratic vs. authoritarian, but whether they 
have the capacity to meet their citizens’ basic 
needs” (Khanna, 2017, p. 15).
In the same way as Howard Scott praised 
“increasing efficiency” brought by the regimes 
of Hitler and Stalin, Parag Khanna assigns a 
large portion of his book to the veneration of 
successful non-democratic countries, especially 
Singapore and China, which he contrasts with 
their less performing democratic counterparts, 
such as India. “China’s spectacular rise versus 
that of democracies,” he writes, “has shown 
the World that it is better to have a system 
focused on delivery without democracy than 
a system that’s too democratic at the expense 
of delivery” (Khanna, 2017, p. 20). However, 
he totally misses the price these countries had 
to pay for their high-performing economies. 
For example, his accolade to the Communist 
dictator Deng Xiaoping whose “accrued 
experiments resulted in China’s economic 
miracle” (Khanna, 2017, p. 26) totally ignores 
his responsibility for the massacre of the 
democratic opposition in the Tiananmen 
Square in 1989. 
As we see, Parag Khanna’s arguments about 
the benefits of technocracy echo the statements 
of Howard Scott formulated almost ninety years 
ago. What is different, though, is his emphasis 
on cutting-edge digital technologies – Big Data 
and supercomputers – as a means to arrive in 
the society of the future. He calls the type of 
state he envisages an “Info-State” and advocates 
the extensive use of digital technologies for 
social planning. There will be no elections 
or referendums in the “Info-State,” because 
its policies will be based directly on data. In 
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totalitarian political projects, starting from 
The Republic by Plato, power did proceed not 
from the consent of the people, but from some 
pre-political, metaphysical “truth” (it could be 
either divine justice or dialectical materialism), 
contemplated by the supreme authority 
(philosophers-kings or the Communist Party). 
In Khanna’s “Info-State,” it is Big Data, which 
again justifies the old idea about the “reign of 
truth.” 
In a nutshell, Parag Khanna’s Technocracy 
in America: Rise of the Info-State promises 
a sterile and flawless unfree world, in which 
the unelected and unaccountable “inner party” 
will govern the society with the help of a larger 
“outer party” of civil “apparatchiks” and Big 
Data technologies while treating it as a private 
enterprise. The citizens of the Info-State will 
no longer be “we, the people.” Instead, they 
will be reduced to a consultation body probed 
via ubiquitous surveillance. 
At the end it is appropriate to ask a question: 
Can Parag Khanna’s Info-State be a model for 
Ukraine? The long experience of living under 
autocratic and totalitarian regimes has contributed 
to our population’s generally low commitment 
to the value of political freedom. Another part 
of this historical legacy is the consumerist and 
materialistic mentality. Therefore, if the “Info-
State” is built in our country, we believe that 
many people will not object to it. At the same 
time, in its recent history Ukraine has undergone 
three political revolutions – the Revolution on 
Granite (1990), the Orange Revolution (2004) 
and the EuroMaidan revolution (2014). In 
all these events, their participants fought for 
the ideals of freedom and democracy against 
sluggish, corrupt and politically bankrupt 
elites. However, imagine a different scenario, 
in which the enemies of political freedom are 
not retrograde, dishonest, luxury-loving and 
criminal politicians, but skilled, Western-
educated, white-collar and performance-
oriented technocrats. Will we go to the Maidan 
Square to protest them and fight for freedom? 
Let us leave this question unanswered.
Conclusions. 
In this article the concept of technocracy 
has been outlined and its features have been 
highlighted. It has been emphasized that this 
political form is pre-occupied primarily with 
the optimization of society’s useful output, 
which it values above democratic procedures 
meant to safeguard political freedom. It 
has been maintained that technocracy 
becomes especially attractive in transitional 
historical periods when humankind invents 
a new rationalistic toolkit laden with great 
transforming power and expectations. In the 
modern world three circumstances make 
technocracy especially appealing. First of 
all, the rise of Big Data digital technologies. 
They foster the idea that human society can 
be ruled based on data rather than democratic 
votes, and, thus, revive the ancient idea of “the 
reign of truth,” which goes back to Plato’s The 
Republic. The second factor is the hardships 
that liberal democracy undergoes in the 
modern world. The hardships include the tide 
of populist movements and politicians that 
swept across Europe and North America in 
recent years, and the global pandemic, which 
demonstrates that it could be surprisingly easy 
for people to give away their freedom and 
yield to technocratic regimentation of their 
lives. The third factor is the competition with 
such countries as China, which make the useful 
output of society (both economic and military) 
a cornerstone of their policies, while having 
little regard for human rights and democratic 
procedures. The struggle with such countries 
urges some of their practices, including 
technocracy, also in the West. The ideas of 
Howard Scott, who advocated technocracy in 
the industrial period, and Parag Khanna, who 
is its champion in the digital age, have been 
discussed and the illiberal nature of both these 
authors' mindset has been shown. Both Scott 
and Khanna admired the autocratic powers of 
the day, had a shared faith in the application 
of rationalistic and scientific methods of 
social management, disregarded democratic 
procedures, which they saw as hurdles on 
the way of economic well-being and political 
power, and advocated their technocratic 
political models as ultra-modern and meeting 
the Zeitgeist of their respective ages. Finally, a 
statement has been made that, because of several 
historical reasons, technocracy potentially 
can be viewed as a viable political option in 
Ukraine and the question has been asked: Will 
political freedom be defended in Ukraine if its 
enemies are skilled and performance-oriented 
technocrats? We deliberately left this question 
unanswered. Perhaps it can be addressed in 
future publications. 
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